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Abstract: Bolstered by the 2008 global financial crisis, and the BRICS’ increased economic 
weight, the group has called for change to global economic governance. The BRICS' critique 
and proposals are towards a re-structuring of global economic governance to reflect their 
increasing weight in the global political economy rather than replacing the principles and 
philosophy (ideas)—explicitly or implicitly—undergirding the neoliberal economic order. 
The changes being proposed can be likened to Hall’s first and second order change which 
simply re-arranges existing policy without bringing about radical changes. The paper argues 
that the conditions necessary for third order change - radical policy change or a paradigm shift 
- do not exist to provide the BRICS with a framework for challenging global economic
governance. These include: (a) the lack of expert consensus on the cause of the crisis and the 
absence of a sufficiently coherent and unified body of ideas to form an alternative model; and 
(b) asymmetries in elements of the research process between those which support the neo
liberal agenda and those which provide counter perspectives.   
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I. Introduction  
 
This paper explores the absence of a third order challenge of the Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa (BRICS) group to global economic governance. The nature of the BRICS 
challenge borrows from Hall’s three levels of policy change; first and second order change 
refers to modifications to certain elements of a particular policy, while third order change to 
an overhaul of the overarching policy framework (Hall 1993:281-287). Third order change 
can be likened to Kuhn’s notion of a “paradigm shift.” The latter refers to a fundamental or 
radical change from “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide 
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.” (Kuhn (1970:viii). Hall 
(1993:280) maintains that: 
instances of policy experimentation and policy failure are likely to play a 
key role in the movement from one paradigm to another. Like scientific 
paradigms, a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of 
anomalies, namely by developments that are not fully comprehensible, even 
as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm […] if the paradigm is 
genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments, […] 
experiments [to resolve them] will result in policy failures that gradually 
undermine the authority of the existing paradigm and its advocates even 
further.  
 
The financial crisis spurred much debate on the adequacy and credibility of the free 
market model to effectively manage the global economy - effectively, equitably and justly. 
Based on Hall’s argument above, the circumstances were ripe for a policy shift in the post 
2008 period because, arguably, the financial crisis highlighted the crisis of the neoliberal 
paradigm, which opened the space for new ideas to emerge for a model for managing the 
global economy. That, coupled with the disquiet with global economic governance, the 
emerging economic prowess of the BRICS on the global stage, the inclusion of the latter via 
the G20, could have provided a window of opportunity for the BRICS to successfully 
challenge and topple the current global (neo liberal) economic order.  
The rationale for referencing the BRICS in relation to fundamentally challenging 
global economic governance is based on these countries’ call for reform of international 
financial institutions in the wake of the financial crisis; and discussions in the academic and 
public spheres assessing the nature of the challenge that the BRICS pose to global economic 
governance. While it is well known that the BRICS themselves benefitted from the existing 
system, it is worth asking, whether the BRICS could have pursued a challenge to the 
underlying philosophy of global economic governance had the following conditions been 
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present: consensus around a body of alternative model for managing the global economy and 
equity in the research sphere which could have given the alternative school greater leverage in 
the policy environment.  This line of thinking is given credence by literature which states that 
ideational considerations assist actors in determining what their interests may be (see for 
example Beland, 2009).  
The orientation of this paper is in its focus on the role of beliefs (ideas) in effecting 
fundamental policy change or reinforcing policy paradigms. Although many agree that the 
BRICS countries are not challenging the philosophical foundation of global economic 
governance, scholars differ in the epistemological positions upon which they base their 
conclusions. Many argue that the BRICS favour the status quo because they profit and benefit 
materially from the existing system. By giving prominence to ideas, the paper does not 
discount, minimize or discredit other factors explaining the BRICS challenge to global 
governance. However, the paper proffers that these explanations do not comprise the totality 
of reasons for the BRICS not pursuing a radical challenge to global economic governance. 
Notwithstanding the significance of other explanations, arguments surrounding ideas are also 
important aspects of the rationale for the BRICS’ behaviour towards global economic 
governance. This paper therefore illustrates that ideational considerations are important for 
understanding the absence of a third order challenge to global economic governance by 
BRICS countries.   
The paper argues, that ideational factors are key considerations for driving policy 
shifts.  In that regard, the paper argues that the conditions do not exist to potentially enable the 
BRICS to mount a third order challenge to global economic governance. Specifically, these 
considerations include: first, a lack of consensus around the cause of the financial crisis 
among experts and the view that the financial crisis was a failure of the neo-liberalism; the 
relative disadvantage of experts who attributed the financial crisis on the flaws of the neo 
liberalism and who have proposed alternatives, the ancillary resources they command and the 
external factors that give them the edge in imposing their ideas over that of their competitors; 
and second, the degree of authoritativeness that one set of ideas has over others in the eyes of 
policy makers. 
To develop this argument, I organise the paper as follows: first, I provide a conceptual 
framework; second, I examine the literature on the divergent perspectives on the BRICS’ 
challenge to global economic governance; third, I outline a general critique of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the WTO; fourth, I state the BRICS’ critique of global economic 
governance, highlighting the first and second, rather than a third order challenge. I do so by 
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illustrating the BRICS’ counter–hegemonic potential and behaviour while at the same time 
supporting the ideas undergirding global economic governance and the West’s domination of 
it; fifth, I show that some (ideational) considerations for third order change are not present to 
provide the BRICS with the context to successfully pursue a new paradigm; finally, I 
conclude by briefly reflecting on the way forward.  
 
II. Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework, borrowed from Farrell and Quiggin (2012) and Hall 
(1993), provides the parameters for understanding the condition under which ideas can play a 
role in policy change. Consensus around ideas plays a role in bringing about legitimacy, and 
by extension, acceptance and implementation of the idea. albeit partly, as material interests 
and power are also in the mix driving legitimacy. 2 Farrell and Quiggin (2012:3-4) argue that 
ideas are more likely to impact policy when there is consensus among the expert community 
within which the ideas are generated. 3If there is dissensus (divisions among experts) and 
these different ideas are adopted by and distributed among the policy community, these ideas 
are less likely to impact policy because policy makers have more options from which to 
choose. According to Farrell and Quiggin, “Whether there is expert consensus or expert 
dissensus will have important consequences for the power of economic ideas [...] expert ideas 
will be most likely to shape political outcomes when they are backed by an apparent 
consensus” (Farrell and Quiggin (2012:10). In the context of this paper, lack of consensus 
among economists is among the important consideration for explaining why a paradigmatic 
shift has not taken place in global economic governance, after the global financial crisis.  
The environment within which ideas operate also matter. Questions of authority, 
legitimacy and access and resources are important considerations for situating the role of 
ideas in influencing a new paradigm (third order change): first, sociological factors such as 
the ‘positional advantages’ that the experts who purport the ideas in question have within the 
broader institutional framework, ‘[…] the ancillary resources they can command’ and external 
factors which may give them the edge in imposing their ideas over their competitors; second, 
                                                          
2 Clarke defines legitimacy in one sense as ‘what can reasonably be accepted by international society as a 
tolerable consensus on which to take action’ (Clarke, 2005: 3). 
3 Epistemic communities have played a key role in generating consensus around ideas (research) which have 
influenced the direction of the global political economy. This is supported by Ikenberry who argued that the 
construction of the post war economic system can be explained mainly by the role played by ‘well-placed British 
and American economists and policy specialists […]’ (Ikenberry, 1992: 291). 
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the degree of authoritativeness that one set of ideas has over others in the eyes of policy 
makers; and third, policy failure around an existing paradigm and attempts at finding an 
alternative, (Hall 1993: 280). Having outlined the conceptual framework, it is necessary to 
provide the literature on the various interpretations of the BRICS’ challenge to global 
economic governance. to establish the novelty of this paper.   
 
III. Perspectives of the BRICS challenge to global economic governance 
 
In the first category of writings, there are diverse conclusions on the nature of the 
BRICS’ opposition to global economic governance; however, what is common is the view 
that, while the BRICS are or may be challenging the nature of global economic governance, 
they are not contesting its philosophical foundations and may be reinforcing Western 
dominance of it in some instances. Further, these writings surmise that the BRICS are simply 
tweaking global economic governance while leaving the neoliberal capitalist paradigm intact. 
Some observe that if anything, members of the BRICS club have made only minor changes to 
the system without disrupting the fundamentals of it. Similarly, those in this category posit 
that the BRICS reform efforts are ‘adjustments’ to the system and should not be seen as a 
challenge to it. For example, Cammack (2012:7) found that in the wake of the financial crisis, 
while the emerging economies were advocating greater representation for themselves and 
developing countries in the Group of 20 (G20) and the international financial institutions 
(IFIs), they were actively advancing ‘global liberalism and universal competiveness…on a 
genuinely global scale.’ Similarly, Bond (2013:266) is of the view that the BRICS are 
reinforcing imperialist structures of global economic governance through ‘sub-imperialist’ 
practices (at the country and regional levels) which support corporate capital and legitimise 
neoliberalism. Kahler (2013) states that the emerging economies have not proposed a 
fundamentally different model of global economic or trade governance and are not expected 
to bring fundamental changes to global governance. He states:  
Overall, the revealed preferences of China, India and Brazil in global 
economic negotiations, both before and after the global financial crisis, were 
those of moderate reformers at best […] It was most often their participation 
in the process of rule creation and institutional evolution that was the key 
issue, not the content of the rules themselves (Kahler, 2013: 716).  
 
On a similar note, some posit that the BRICS are content to be a part of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
G20 and do not oppose these organisations in principle. What they oppose and propose 
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reform for, are issues related to their participation.  Among these issues are inadequate 
representation and inequity deriving from the dominance of Western powers of global 
economic institutions.  Armijo and Roberts (2014:25) say that rising states– at least in time – 
by virtue of their increasing projected material capabilities, will challenge US hegemonic 
influence and shift the Western dominated agenda of international organisations. Cooper 
posits that while emerging powers have ‘contested’ global governance by forming the BRICS 
alliance, the BRICS favour the G20. However ‘(c)ontestation is targeted at […] functional 
issues of national interest and in leveraging their position inside the G20 for great [sic] 
fairness and equality of the system.’ (Cooper, 2014: 89, 106). Stephen (2012:309) shows that 
while there are differences across issue areas, India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) states, 
they generally adopt a reformist posture to international institutions. In fact they “are 
multilateral activists strongly involved in international institutions, which they try to reform 
from the inside in their own favour.”  
Others say the BRICS are ‘diversifying’ global governance by creating parallel 
structures alongside Western created and dominated ones. This means that in a sense, the 
BRICS are seeking to strengthen their position in global economic governance from both 
within and outside of the existing system. Chin and Thakur (2010: 120) assert that China has 
conveniently been engaging increasingly in global governance but at the same time it has 
been exploring regional alternatives.  Some claim that though independent of Western 
influence, regional options are not necessarily based on alternative models. Sohn proffers that 
China is neither challenging nor reinforcing global governance. Instead they are 
simultaneously establishing independent regional financial institutions (Sohn, 2013: 630-648). 
Shield (2014:148) observes the same because China is considering bilateral and regional trade 
agreements and other alternative financial arrangements while also operating within existing 
global economic structures.  
The other school of thought is that the BRICS are challenging the foundations of 
global economic governance and are proposing and/or creating alternatives to the neoliberal 
models.  For instance, Chin and Thakur (2010: 120) suggest that China, in concert with Brazil 
and India, are seeking to transpose their domestic model of the ‘developmental state’ to the 
global arena. Stephen (2014: 19) argues that while BRICs states support the idea of global 
governance, illustrated by their ‘…embrac[ing] [of] a rules-based international order and deep 
economic exchange and interdependence…’ they are promoting principles that are advancing 
a new form of governance. He states further: 
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In contrast to the more liberal forms of state of the established powers, the 
BRICs can be understood as integrated state capitalist state–society 
complexes: integrated in the global economy, but with a commanding role 
reserved for state and quasi-state entities in organizing the economy (ibid: 
12-13). 
 
There are those who think that the external environment plays a role in the outcome of 
the BRICS’ challenge to global economic governance.  For example, Beeson (2013: 246) 
contends that even if China, the leading BRICS power, has the material capability to pose a 
challenge to global economic governance, the current context is not conducive as in previous 
historical epochs for an ideological shift to take place; neither is there an alternative Chinese 
vision which has a global appeal or reach.  
Another element of the literature of interest to this paper is the philosophical 
orientation undergirding the explanations for the BRICS challenge to global economic 
governance.  Many proffer materialist explanations for the behaviour of the BRICS bloc and 
individual countries in global governance; fewer provide ideational explanations. I provide 
the philosophical approaches which undergird the explanations for the BRICS challenge of 
global economic governance mainly for the works discussed above.  Stephen (2014) utilises a 
historical materialist approach based on the supposition that BRICs behaviour is informed by 
the structural features of global capitalism.  Other works with materialist explanations cite 
interests, capabilities and power.  Cammack (2012:8) explains the emerging powers’ 
promotion of ‘global developmental liberalism’ by showing the BRICS’ interests in being 
integrated in the global economy ‘through the pursuit of overseas markets and global 
competitiveness.’  Beeson (2013:245) reasons that the inability of China to lead at the regional 
level – despite its increasing material capability – is hindered by many geostrategic and 
geopolitical considerations, including: the “reassertion of US strategic influence” in the Asia-
Pacific region. Bond (2013:266) explains the reinforcement of neoliberalism by South Africa 
through sub–imperialist practices via the facilitation of corporate capital and seeking new 
markets for raw materials, among other material factors. Kahler (2013: 714) posits that the 
emerging economies are seeking to influence global economic governance on the basis of 
their new economic weight, advocating for increasing their quota shares and greater 
representation in the IFIs.  Armijo and Roberts (2014:507) also base the emerging powers’ 
challenge to global economic governance on their increasing material capabilities. 
On the other hand, Cooper (2014:106) bases his argument of the formation of the 
BRICs alliance and their attitude to the G20 and global economic governance, in general, 
upon largely non-material considerations — their desire to be insiders and the prestige that is 
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associated with it. Some anchor their explanations in both materialist and ideational factors.   
Chin and Thakur (2010: 120) seem to have anchored their analysis of China’s ability to 
change the rules of the global order in both material and ideational factors — China’s new 
status in the global economy, national interests and ‘a desire to identify with other rising big 
powers such as Brazil and India.’ Sohn (2013:632, 634) also considers the interplay between 
materialist and non-materialist factors for explaining China’s behaviour in global governance 
— their ‘increas[ing]…bargaining power…wider range of policy options, a decline in 
hegemonic neoliberal ideas’ and the revival of regionalism. Wang and French (2013: 985-
999) found that ideational factors played a greater role in middle powers’ contribution to 
global governance than material capabilities. They contend however that each set of factors 
play a role, pointing to the need for an eclectic theoretical approach for understanding the 
subject. 
Notwithstanding the importance of materialist explanations, this paper adds to the 
relative paucity of literature on the role of ideational factors by exploring the role of, and 
factors which affect the influence of expert ideas.  Having said that, I now outline a critique of 
global economic governance and the neo liberal model to provide the broader context for 




a) Critique of global economic governance 
 
Since the founding of the IMF and World Bank in 1944 and the WTO in 1995, these 
institutions have been the target of a wide range of criticisms, related to governance processes 
and policy outcomes.  Some have called for the IMF and the World Bank to be abolished 
(Danaher, 2004). Others have called for reform, citing democratic accountability and 
legitimacy challenges.  Some argue, for example, that the IMF is accountable more to the 
“financial markets and their representatives” than to governments who were elected by the 
citizenry – pointing to the perception that the IMF represents elite interests. The institution’s 
lack of democratic representation also stems from the weighted voting system (Stiglitz, 
2003:120) which does not reflect the current global economic and power distribution.  It is 
believed that genuine participation is hindered because countries with divergent views are 
pressured to agree via the consensus decision making method. The fact that the Executive 
Boards of the IMF and the World Bank do not represent the general membership of the 
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organisations (Woods 2001: 85), in particular, countries which are most heavily involved with 
the IFI programmes, adds to the democratic deficit of the institutions. The WTO too has been 
widely criticised for having a democratic deficit and by extension a legitimacy gap, including 
lack of transparency in negotiations (for example, Green room meetings); inequitable 
participation of developing countries Labonte (2002:79); and lack of direct citizen 
participation, resulting in a high degree of alienation of citizens from the workings of the 
organisation (Guzman, 2004:337). While steps have been taken to address criticisms about the 
democratic deficit, challenges remain in the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO (Woods and 
Narlikar, 2001: 579; Albin, 2008: 757). 
The neoliberal foundation of the IFIs and the WTO has also attracted criticism.  Much 
of this stems from the consequences of neoliberal polices on developing countries and the 
poor and vulnerable, in general. This criticism has emerged from civil society as well as 
academic and policy circles. The civil society critique can be seen in the activities of the anti-
globalisation movement – networks and coalitions of social movements and civil society 
opposed to corporate globalisation in its various forms (see for example, Eschle, 2004). In 
academic circles, theoretical critiques have also been launched explaining the shortcomings of 
neoliberalism as a development strategy. For example, Brohman identified several flaws of its 
neo classical theoretical foundation which reduces people “to isolated creatures of the 
marketplace, devoid of history, cultural traditions, political opinions and social relationships 
beyond simple market exchanges” (Brohman, 1995:297). According to Brohman, 
neoliberalism: 
reduces the complexity of real-world decision making to the universal trait 
of economically rational choice making […;]  dependence on an essentially 
positivist mode of scientific enquiry [… which] restrict[s] research to the 
narrow empirical world of observable events and phenomena [in which] 
[o]ther components of reality, such as social relations, values, meanings and 
interpretations, are excluded from serious consideration [and] its 
inappropriate treatment of issues related to the environment and 
sustainability (Brohman, 1995:314-315). 
 
I now turn to the BRICS challenge specifically, having outlined the general criticisms 
of the IMF and the World Bank.  This section shows that the BRICS are posing a first and 
second, rather than a third order challenge to global economic governance by rejecting certain 
aspects of the system while supporting the ideas undergirding global economic governance 
and the West’s domination of it.    
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IV. BRICS opposition to Western domination of the global economic order 
 
BRICS countries, individually and collectively, are pushing back against the Western 
dominated global economic (and political) order. The statement by the Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sergei Lavrov stated that the BRICS “illustrate a new polycentric system of 
international relations”, supports the above assertion (BBC News, 2015: paragraph 9). The 
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS New 
Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the latter 
having the potential to conduct transactions in the BRICS’ currency, illustrate BRICS’ 
members’ intentions and the potential to challenge Western dominance in the financial and 
economic spheres. The AIIB, in a sense, challenges the Asian Development Bank and the 
IMF, in which the US (and Japan in the former) have significant and hegemonic influence 
(Schmidt, 2015:121-140).  The membership of fourteen EU member states and other key US 
allies in the AIIB has also strengthened the former’s role and prestige (and China by 
extension), and both the NDB and the AIIB could potentially shift global development 
projects away from Western control and dominance. Importantly, the AIIB counterbalances 
US and Japanese economic power and influence in Asia.   
The BRICS New Development Bank and the accompanying CRA are additional 
evidence of BRICS’ counter hegemonic behaviour. The establishment of the NDB and the 
CRA are clear indications that the BRICS are decentralising financial and economic power 
and influence away from the West, in particular, that of the US in IFIs – the IMF and the 
World Bank.  The stated purpose of the NDB to “mobilize resources for infrastructure and 
sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing 
countries” (Agreement on the New Development Bank, Article 1), suggests a lessening of 
dependence on the West for the South’s economic development. The BRICS are also 
attempting to be different from the Bretton Woods financial institutions in terms of process.  
For example, the five BRICS countries have equal voting power, as the Bank’s capital is 
shared equally among members (German Development Institute, 2015:4).4 In addition to the 
concrete actions of the BRICS outlined above, the BRICS’ counter-hegemonic stance is also 
manifested in symbolic terms, as exemplified by their rejection of automatic European 
leadership of the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2011: paragraphs 1-6).                                                                                                                   
 
                                                          
4 German Development Institute, “Financing Global Development: The BRICS New Development Bank.”  
Briefing Paper no.13, (2015), p. 4, available:  https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_13.2015.pdf.   
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V. BRICS support and reinforcement of the global economic order and Western 
hegemony 
 
Borrowing from the reasoning of Langley (2004)  on proposals for a New International 
Financial Architecture, I argue that in some aspects, the BRICS proposals for governance 
reform relating to transparency and representation are technical, and a-political in nature and 
do not challenge the fundamentals of the existing system, i.e. its neoliberal underpinnings. 
Although the BRICS proposal for ‘policy space’ suggests prioritising government 
intervention over market forces and supranational governance for developing countries, the 
BRICS are in fact, reinforcing the substance and supporting, for the most part, the principles 
of the  Western created and dominated  neoliberal model of development. Private corporate 
interests are encouraged in all, and promoted, even aggressively, in some BRICS countries. 
For example, since the early 1990s, China, which has been the most statist among the BRICS 
countries, has been promoting the expansion of Chinese private investment abroad. For 
example, in Africa, China has been encouraging investment by private multinational 
corporations in their projects.  In fact, larger State Owned Enterprises (SOE)-led projects 
provide avenues for the entry of smaller private enterprises (Nölke, 2014:77-89). The 
participation of private investors and lenders in the NDB also illustrates that the BRICS are 
not averse to private corporate interests.   
More recent developments, the same ones illustrating the BRICS anti-hegemonic 
stance are, at the same time, supportive of global capital and the neoliberal paradigm. In 
essence, while the BRICS are concerned that the US and the EU dominate the system, they 
are taking steps to share in this dominance and they are doing so within the existing neoliberal 
capitalist paradigm. Transactions of the AIIB, the NDB and the CRA are all conducted in US 
dollars, which means that rather than threatening, these are, in actuality, reinforcing the 
hegemony of the dollar. The BRICS currency reserve pool on the other hand holds greater 
promise for undermining the dollar because it allows for conducting financial transactions in 
the BRICS’ local currencies. However, there are challenges for BRICS countries who are 
highly indebted to the IFIs and whose loans are dollar denominated to participate. For 
example, at the end of March 2015, India’s external debt stood at US$ 475.8 billion, of which 
the majority — 58. 3 percent — was US dollar denominated (Reserve Bank of India, 
paragraphs 3, 6). Notably, the CRA empowers the IMF — rather than diminishes its role — 
through the clause (similar to that of the Chiang Mai Initiative after the Asian Crisis in the 
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1990s) which requires IMF approval for borrowing over 30 percent of members’ quota 
(Treaty for the Establishment of a Brics Contingent Reserve Arrangement, 2014:Art 5:c).With 
South Africa’s debt estimated to be 43.1 percent of GDP in 2013 (Saxegaard, 2014:3) the 
CRA may bring South Africa under greater IMF surveillance.   
The NDB is seen by some as revolutionary. Notably, however, not surprisingly, the 
BRICS group does not envisage the NDB as a replacement for the Bretton Woods 
Institutions; but rather as a “supplement [to…] multilateral and regional financial 
institutions.[…]” (Fortaleza Declaration, 2014:paragraph 11). Moreover, the NDB serves as 
an instrument of capitalist expansion by virtue of its proposed role to finance public but also 
private infrastructural projects in BRICS and other developing countries. These projects will 
most likely include infrastructure geared towards the mining sectors, a key priority for the 
BRICS and other developing countries, Africa, in particular. Unchecked environmental 
damage at the expense of profit is typically associated with these development projects.   
Finally, the BRICS New Development Bank top executives are either former private 
bankers or former IMF and World Bank staff, indicating the philosophy of the leadership is 
not necessarily anti-neoliberal.  For example, former and current Vice-Presidents include, 
Brazil’s Paulo Batista5, an IMF Executive Director, and China’s Xian Zhu, former Vice-
President of the World Bank, respectively.  
In terms of process, in principle, the BRICS group is also reinforcing the elite club 
governance structure of global economic governance.  As others have noted (Payne, 2014:73-
85), the participation of the BRICS countries in the G20 framework, though more inclusive 
than the G7/8 framework, is an expanded exclusive club among the developed and emerging 
economies with little direct or indirect participation of the global community. It is assumed, as 
has been done in the past, that those countries with heavier economic weight, and the ability 
to carry the economic burden, know how to best manage the global economy. The inclusion 
of BRICS countries, based on their phenomenal GDP growth in the global economy, simply 
expands the elite model of decision making, rather than democratizes it. 
Furthermore, the BRICS have called for greater participation of emerging economies 
based on their increased economic weight in the world economy, reinforcing the participation 
principles of the IMF and the World Bank. In the Fortaleza Declaration (paragraph 7), the 
BRICS stated that the IMF reform process should take place to “better reflect the increasing 
                                                          
5 Batista no longer holds this post as of October, 2017. 
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weight of EMDCs6 in the world economy… [and] [t]he Fund must remain a quota-based 
institution.” While the BRICS have made a case for updating the existing formulas to reflect 
current realities, they have not questioned the principle behind the method. In fact, emerging 
economies are now ready to make greater contributions to IFIs because of promises of 
increased quota shares and higher level representation (Kahler, 2013:714). This proposal 
could potentially weaken the voice of the poorest countries in the global economic 
institutions.  For example, the increase of BRICS countries' quotas, with the continued 
dominance of the US and Europe, could diminish the relative weight of other developing 
countries. For instance, Africa’s voting shares declined to 5.7 percent and 5.9 percent after the 
2010 and 2011 reforms, falling from 6.0 percent before the quota share increases for China, 
Korea, Mexico and Turkey in 2006 (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
The BRICSs proposal for a new trading system based on openness, stability, equity 
and non-discrimination, without disguised protectionism and restrictions,  is not radically 
different from the principles of the current multilateral trading system, which is based on 
‘trade without discrimination’; ‘freer trade’ —  the BRICS equivalence of  removal of 
protectionism and trade restrictions; ‘predictability’ — equivalent to the BRICS  ‘openness’ 
and ‘stability’;  and ‘promoting fair competition’ — the equivalence of equity in the BRICS 
language. Bearing in mind that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) is a UN body, embodying the principles of representativeness and voice - that the 
BRICS group espouses, the BRICS have not called for the UNCTAD to be the centre of 
global trade, finance and investment. Instead they simply “reaffirm(ed) the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) mandate as the focal point in the UN 
system” (Fortaleza Declaration, 2014: paragraph 22).  
 
VI. Absence of Conditions for Paradigm Shift 
 
Notwithstanding the BRICS support for a model from which they have benefitted, the 
conditions outlined below – dissensus among experts and asymmetries in the research realm - 
do not support or facilitate a fundamental challenge to the existing global economic order and 
the exploration of an alternative which the BRICS could even consider.  
 
a) Dissensus among Experts  
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… expert ideas will be most likely to shape political outcomes when they are 
backed by an apparent consensus” (Farrell and Quiggin, 2012:10). 
 
Although many have attributed the financial crisis to the failure of neo liberalism, 
there has not been a consensus that the root cause of the financial crisis stemmed from the 
flaws of the neo – liberal model, neither has been consensus around the need for, or a 
proposed alternative model among the relevant epistemic communities. This dissensus has 
hindered the possibility of developing a perceived legitimate alternative model in the policy 
realm. The continuation of the neoliberal order is therefore supported by the disagreements 
and fragmentation in the academic community and policy circles around the causes of the 
2008 financial crisis or proposed solutions and alternatives.  Following the reasoning of 
Farrell and Quiggin, the ‘dissensus’ which exists among experts and the absence of consensus 
around an outright rejection of the neoliberal framework, undermines the possibility of a 
paradigm shift taking place in global economic governance. (Farrell and Quiggin, 2012: 3-4).  
Lo (2012: 151–178) in a review of twenty-one books on the cause of the financial crisis, 
found very different explanations of it. In addition, the Chairman of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve said the “fundamental causes [of the financial crisis] remain in 
dispute” (Bernanke, 2009: paragraph 1). One scholar said the crisis resulted from 
“uncontrolled financial deregulation” (Lin and Treichel, 2012:72). Another said, it resulted 
from “systemic failure […] due to the absence of a global rule-making authority to oversee 
global private financial institutions and processes” (Goldin and Vogel, 2010:6). Others 
attributed the crisis to the failure of the discipline of economics which were unable to provide 
adequate tools to predict the crisis and a lack of transparency in their economic modelling 
(Colander, Föllmer, Haas, et al, 2009:14). It was further argued that it was the obsession with 
mathematical modelling while ignoring broader socio-politico-historical factors that led to the 
failure of economists to predict and not heed warnings by some of the crisis (Hodgson, 2009: 
1205-1221). Panitch and Konings (2009:61) concur that deregulation was responsible for the 
financial crisis which began decades before the neoliberal era. Others suggested that the 
financial crisis was caused by the risky behaviour and poor management of the mortgage 
housing market (Vieira, 2011:217-237; Coffee, 2009: 1 – 22; Poole, 2010: 421-441; Yeoh, 
2009: 42–69; and Acharya and Richardson, 2009: 195–210). Vieira noted that the financial 
crisis was “a crisis of confidence” and risky lending in the housing market whose ripple effect 
had international repercussions; although she concluded that “This new era should change the 
widespread liberal argument that the market is always efficient, or at least, more efficient than 
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any State intervention” (Vieira, 2011:235). Legg and Harris (2009: 366) point to the lack of 
transparency in the process of offering products to clients which did not allow them to assess 
the risk being undertaken; uncertainty about the value of products offered; inadequate 
regulation; an “unregulated shadow banking system”; and incentive misalignment and 
globalisation of capital flows. Yeoh (2009:44) reports that the crisis has been attributed to 
several factors: “adverse macro-economic conditions, bad corporate governance and loose 
regulatory oversight” but he surmises that the governance factors are the most relevant. 
Official inquiry into the crisis blamed the crisis on similar issues and provided the following 
general causes:  
widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision…dramatic 
failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically 
important financial institutions… a combination of excessive borrowing, 
risky investments, and lack of transparency…”; lack of government 
preparation “for the crisis, and its inconsistent response added to the 
uncertainty and panic in the financial markets; [and] systemic breakdown in 
accountability and ethics. “ The Commission stated that the causes identified 
in their report must be viewed in the context of human nature and individual 
and societal responsibility […] It was the failure to account for human 
weakness that is relevant to this crisis […] the crisis was a result of human 
mistakes, misjudgements, and misdeeds that resulted in systemic failures 
[…] (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011: xviii-xxiii). 
  
Some thought that the financial crisis signified a deeper problem beyond risky 
behaviour in the mortgage market. Scholars in this camp believe that it was a crisis of 
neoliberalism (Ceceña, 2009: 33-43; Altvater, 2009: 73 - 86; Stiglitz, 2009: 1-21; Kotz 
2015:3). Some who share this view called for radical reform and an overhaul of the economic 
model upon which global economic governance is based (third order change). According to 
Stiglitz (2009:19), the crisis resulted from the “failures in the financial system, to a large 
extent they were doing what actors in a market system are supposed to do: pursue their own 
self-interest.” Rather than calling for improving the existing model of economic governance, 
Stiglitz called for a paradigm shift, i.e. changing the philosophy and foundation upon which 
global economic governance is based. He said, “there will be heroic efforts to add 
complexities and refinements to the standard paradigm. The resulting models will be an 
improvement and policies based on them may do better, but they too are likely to fail. 
Nothing less than a paradigm shift will do.” Stiglitz (2009:7).  
 
b) Asymmetries in the research process and outcome 
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Although alternative ideas exist (See for example, Jones and O’Donnell (2017), Isidro 
Luna (2015); Westra (2010)7; and Weaver, Jacobs and Baker (2002), these have not been able 
to displace the neo liberal paradigm as the template for global economic governance. 
According to Hall (1990), asymmetries among experts in the following areas: having a 
position of advantage in the broader institutional framework, access, resources, perceived 
authoritativeness of ideas by policy makers and  external factors, affect the degree of 
influence of the ideas being promoted. Ideas which come from those with: greater leverage, 
resources and access and who are seen to possess more credibility in the eyes of policy 
makers are likely to impact policy in a greater measure. The advantage that experts and 
advocates of neo liberal ideas have over those with counter views have played an important 
role in maintaining the neo liberal model. The neo liberal model was promoted through the 
World Bank and the IMF which are dominated (by virtue of the quota system) by the United 
States and Europe. The neo-liberal model was the outcome of an organised, collaborative 
intellectual project promoted by a network of powerful forces and actors; it has also been 
maintained through this mechanism.  According to Broad (2006), with reference to the World 
Bank,  researchers whose work support the neo liberal research are systematically encouraged 
and those who do not, are discouraged and punished.8 By virtue of the privileged and 
dominant positions of powerful countries in global economic institutions, research outcomes 
which support their agendas have an advantage in the global policy arena over alternative 
research, in terms of funding, resources and access to policy makers. Consequently, the 
outcome of pro-neoliberal research is likely to have more leverage and greater influence on 
the broader policy environment and the public sphere, over others. Although some neo-liberal 
advocates within the mainstream have distanced themselves from it or directly criticised the 
ability of the policy - albeit some aspects - to deliver development outcomes9, substantive 
                                                          
7 The collection includes, among others, chapters by Dani Rodrik, After Neoliberalism, What? and Tom Palley, 
Domestic Demand-Led Growth: A New Paradigm for Development. Available in: http://www.new-
rules.org/storage/documents/afterneolib/palley.pdf 
8 See Robin Broad (2006), Research, knowledge and the art of paradigm maintenance: The World Bank’s 
Development Economics Vice Presidency (DEC), for a discussion of the ways the neo liberal paradigm is 
deliberately promoted and maintained by the World Bank through their Research Department.   
9 Ostry, Loungani and Furceri (2016), came to the following conclusions on two specific elements of the neo 
liberal agenda - capital account liberalization and fiscal consolidation or austerity: (a) “The benefits in terms of 
increased growth seem fairly difficult to establish when looking at a broad group of countries; (b) The costs in 
terms of increased inequality are prominent; and (c) Increased inequality in turn hurts the level and sustainability 
of growth. Even if growth is the sole or main purpose of the neoliberal agenda, advocates of that agenda still 
need to pay attention to the distributional effects.”Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri,  
Neoliberalism: Oversold?, Finance & Development, June 2016, Vol. 53, No. 2.  
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critique of neo liberalism and alternatives have largely come from outside mainstream spaces, 
viz progressive civil society, think tanks and academia who do not have the privileged 
positions of neo liberal proponents and advocates. Although there are examples of 
collaborative efforts, for the most part, counter-hegemonic research and efforts have not been 




Broadly, the paper has highlighted continuity in global economic governance with the 
role of ideas as the focus. The rationale for using the BRICS as the group of countries that 
could potentially play a role in pursuing a paradigm shift, is based on their critique of global 
economic governance - albeit it being reformist in orientation - their economic prowess and 
the capability this provides them to fundamentally challenge the system.  The paper concurs 
with existing works which states that while BRICS countries are seeking to decentralise 
power in global economic governance and are making minor policy adjustments (first and 
second order changes), they have not yet engendered changes that amount to a paradigm shift 
(third order change) in global economic governance. The paper’s novelty is in highlighting, 
the factors which hinder the effect that ideas could have had on the BRICS’ potentially 
mounting a fundamental challenge to global economic governance, following the global 
financial crisis. The paper posits that a paradigm shift has been hindered by the absence of 
consensus on an alternative set of ideas to replace the neoliberal model of global economic 
governance as well as asymmetries among researchers and in the research process.  
The neoliberal model came about as an outcome of a set of related ideas which formed 
a unified coherent framework of economic governance. The paper concludes that 
notwithstanding the role that interest based factors have played in informing the reformist 
orientation of the BRICS challenge to global economic governance, the consolidation of an 
alternative set of ideas or model – which is seen to benefit the BRICS’ materially, and that of 
their populations – could drive the BRICS to mount a successful third order challenge to 
global economic governance.  Part of the solution therefore lies in the development of a 
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